dashboardmodule-08
CRITICALStuxnet Sabotage
Interactive simulation and visual analysis of the attack vector.
01Authenticode Verification
Stuxnet utilized stolen private keys from Realtek and JMicron to digitally sign its kernel drivers. This allowed the malware to silently bypass Windows Driver Signature Enforcement.
Windows Kernel Mode Code Signing
Windows x64 strictly requires all kernel-mode drivers (`.sys`) to be digitally signed by a trusted Certificate Authority. Stuxnet bypassed this by stealing private keys from legitimate hardware manufacturers.
mrxnet.sys
Signer: Realtek Semiconductor Corp.
Status: Pending
Status: Pending
mrxcls.sys
Signer: JMicron Technology Corp.
Status: Pending
Status: Pending
ATTACKER TERMINAL // KERNEL ACCESS LOG
02Rootkit Stealth
Once in the kernel (Ring 0), the malware hooked NTDLL APIs like NtQueryDirectoryFile, perfectly hiding its payload files (~WTR*.tmp) from the OS, antivirus, and users.
Task Manager User Mode (Ring 3)
Explorer.exe (Query Files)
NtQueryDirectoryFile()
NTDLL.DLL
Windows Kernel (Ring 0)
Dir Output (USB Drive):
report_2010.pdf
wincc_backup.bak
~WTR4141.tmp (Stuxnet Payload)
~WTR4132.tmp (Stuxnet Hook)
autorun.inf
03Air-Gapped Propagation
Since the target nuclear facility was physically disconnected from the internet (air-gapped), Stuxnet infected USB flash drives to physically cross the boundary.